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Abstract 
Anthrax is a non-contagious infectious disease; it primarily affects herbivores, but all 
mammals, including humans, can be affected. Humans may contract anthrax directly or 
indirectly from infected animals. Veterinary surveillance systems, providing information 
about animal and human cases, should increase the efficacy of the animal anthrax man-
agement in order to protect population. Any aspect of the disease should be carefully 
monitored to implement effective prevention and control strategies. In this paper we 
propose a new, detailed classification of anthrax outbreaks, based on the source of the 
infection and the risk level for humans. We describe three different types of animal out-
breaks and suggest the most effective procedures for their management and prevention. 
INTRODUCTION
Anthrax is a non-contagious infectious disease that 
affects a wide range of animal species including hu-
mans. Bacillus anthracis, the etiological agent of an-
thrax, forms long-lasting, highly resistant spores able 
to persist into environment for several decades [1]. 
Ruminants such as cattle, sheep and goats are the 
most susceptible and commonly affected farm ani-
mals. They usually contract the disease through in-
gestion of soil-borne anthrax spores and die acutely. 
In humans, the disease is acquired from contact with 
anthrax-infected animals or anthrax-contaminated 
animal products. Three types of human anthrax occur, 
depending of exposure: cutaneous, which is usually 
non-fatal, gastrointestinal and inhalational which are 
both fatal. Recently, a further fatal form was reported 
in drug users who have injected drugs contaminated 
with anthrax spores [2]. Since it is relatively easy and 
inexpensive to obtain, B. anthracis is one of the pre-
ferred pathogenic agents for use as bacteriological 
weapon in bio-terrorist attacks [3], as demonstrated 
by the events surrounding the September 2011 bio-
terrorist attacks in which anthrax spores were inten-
tionally released through contaminated letters. 
The risk of humans contracting anthrax is related to 
many factors, first of all the origin of the infection in 
the animal outbreak. Veterinary surveillance systems, 
including collection, collation and analysis of data is 
crucial for the effective management of animal an-
thrax to protect populations. Monitoring of changes 
in any aspect of the disease is needed to appropri-
ately modify prevention and control activities. 
In this paper we propose a detailed classification of 
anthrax outbreaks, based on the source of the infection 
and the risk level for humans. We have defined three 
different types of animal outbreaks and suggest the 
most effective procedures for their management and 
the prevention. 
Depending on the source of infection, animal anthrax 
outbreaks can take one of three forms: classic sporadic 
outbreak, atypical outbreak and epidemic outbreak.
THE CLASSIC SPORADIC OUTBREAK 
Description
This form occurs in areas where anthrax is enzootic. 
Infection results from contaminated pastures. These 
outbreaks are sporadic, and usually involve initially only 
1-3 animals. They originate in the soil, causing animals 
to become infected by grazing. Contamination arises 
from buried infected carcasses or when areas are irrigat-
ed with effluents from tanneries, or wool or hair mills. 
Other sources of contamination of the areas are sapro-
phytic carnivores, whose feces can disperse the spores 
in the environment [4]. Blow flies also play a role when 
they feed on dead animals, and later vomit the ingest-
ed blood containing B. anthracis vegetative cells onto 
leaves where they sporulate, thereby spreading them in 
the environment [5].
These outbreaks usually occur during the summer 

























lowing brief rain showers, and are limited to alkaline cal-
ciferous soils, e.g. black steppe soils. The fact that the dis-
ease tends to occur mostly in summer leads us to assume 
that woody forage, which contributes to the formation 
of small lesions, as well as the scarcity of pasture, forces 
the animals to eat very close to the ground [6]. The hot 
dry weather also reduces the innate animal resistance, so 
that even a small number of spores result in infection.
Risk factors 
The sporadic outbreaks are the most widespread, 
and although they represent a serious health problem 
they seem to carry a low risk while in reality maintain-
ing soil recontamination with spores. In fact, in areas 
where anthrax is enzootic, breeders and veterinarians 
are usually aware of the disease and it is considered 
every time there is an unexpected death. However in 
economically very poor regions where vaccination pro-
grams fail to be carried out despite awareness of the 
danger, breeders tend to slaughter sick animals to sell 
meat at a reduced price or to recover the animal skins 
to minimize the cost. This causes a high numbers of 
human cases in several countries, and occurs with par-
ticular severity in Bangladesh [7], Central Asia, and 
southern Africa. 
Management
Proper management of an outbreak involves:
a) avoid the dispersion of biological fluids during 
sample collection;
b) correct handling of carcasses; 
c) check the temperatures of all animals and vacci-
nate animals quickly with normal temperatures 
that are at risk of infection; 
d) delay the vaccination of animals with suspected ill-
ness and initiate antibiotic treatment;
e) vaccinate these latter animals ten days after sus-
pension of antibiotic treatment;
f) perform a genotypic analysis of the isolated 
strain(s) to verify the origin of infection;
g) suspend the sale of milk and meat from the animals 
on the infected farm for 10 days after vaccination 
or the last known death. 
Preventive activity
To prevent this type of outbreak, measures to reduce 
environmental contamination must be taken. These in-
clude:
a) implement programs of annual herd vaccination, 
especially of known affected herds and animals on 
adjoining farms;
b) identification of areas at risk through environmen-
tal analysis;
c) avoid producing forage on soils with high levels of 
contamination;
d) compensate farmers who report illness and do not 
slaughter sick animals;
e) sensitize stakeholders: farmers, butchers, veteri-
narian and physicians;
f) training and information, with particular reference 




This form is associated with the use of forages (e.g., 
hay, silage) produced on contaminated land (“champs 
maudits”), and with products of animal origin such as 
inadequately sterilized meat and bone meals derived 
from the infected carcasses. These products are very 
dangerous because they can cause unexpected anthrax 
outbreaks in conditions and situations epidemiologi-
cally very different from the classic episodes of telluric 
origin.
Risk factors
The risk factors associated with atypical anthrax out-
breaks can be identified as follows:
a) they may occur in areas where the disease is un-
known, or has disappeared, or has been eradicated 
for many years;
b) they can occur at any time of the year and in epide-
miological situations very different from the classic 
form;
c) typically they involve animals that are not on pas-
ture, but are housed, and receiving supplemental 
feeds, e.g. pigs, and dairy cows in winter or mon-
soon seasons;
d) simultaneous outbreaks may occur on several non-
adjoining farms in the same area, or on distant 
farms sharing the same contaminated feed source.
Atypical anthrax outbreaks are the most dangerous 
to humans, especially when they develop in areas con-
sidered to be free of risk and where the disease is for-
gotten. The worst risk is an incorrect animal diagno-
sis that can result in humans becoming infected due 
to mismanagement of the carcasses, e.g., skinning. 
Another aspect that should not be underestimated is 
that physicians, not knowing the disease, may give a 
wrong diagnosis, with serious consequences for the 
patient’s health [8].
Management 
The management of this kind of outbreak is all the 
more difficult in areas where the disease is unknown, 
because a correct diagnosis nearly always comes with a 
certain delay. The following steps must be taken:
a) avoid the dispersion of biological fluids during 
sample collection;
b) correct handling of carcasses, such as incineration, 
hollowing and site boundaries;
c) immediately cease using the suspect feeds;
d) carry out laboratory tests on samples of the suspect 
feeds;
e) inform the sanitary authorities, who will prohibit 
the sale of the suspect feed until sterilization cer-
tification can be instituted in relation to meat and 
bone meals;
f) check the temperatures of all animals and quickly 
vaccinate all animals at risk of infection with nor-
mal temperatures;
g) delay the vaccination of animals with suspected ill-
ness and initiate antibiotic treatment;
h) vaccinate these latter animals ten days after sus-
pension of antibiotic treatment;
























i) perform a genotypic analysis of the isolated strains 
and verify its correspondence with the strains iso-
lated at the origin of the forage;
j) suspend the sale of milk and meat from the animals 
on the infected farm for 10 days after vaccination 
or the last known death. 
Preventive activity 
This form of the disease is very difficult to predict 
and prevent but when the potential is recognised farm-
ers and ranchers can be quickly warned of the risk, and 
when it involves contaminated feedstuffs a programme 
for overseen and certified sterilization can be put in 
place. Regular monitoring of meat and bone meals is 
more cost affective than reactive livestock vacination. A 
proper epidemiological investigation is needed to verify 
that the animals have not been fed with fodder from 
areas at risk or with supplemental bone meal. The give-
away is when the outbreak occurs at a time or place 




This form is an evolution of the classic sporadic 
form due to the activities of haemophagic flies. Taba-
nids feeding on moribund animals, especially during 
the bacteraemic phase, are able to transfer the patho-
gen to healthy animals in the same or neighbouring 
herds, causing a disease characterized by extensive 
oedema. However under the right circumstances it 
can result in singular cases stretching some 10 to 15 
kilometers from the source outbreak. Generally, the 
gadflies suck the blood of large herbivores, such as 
horses and large ruminants in broad daylight on hot 
windless days, hence the greatest intensity in mid-
dle and late summer [9]. The pathogen does not es-
tablish any biological relationship with the carrier. 
However, the danger for humans comes from bites 
by disease-carrying insects. A cutaneous case of hu-
man anthrax due to the bite of horse fly was recently 
reported [10].
Risk factors
This form is an exceptional evolution of a classic an-
thrax outbreak:
a) epidemic-like anthrax develops in areas where the 
disease is enzootic and where vaccination pro-
grams may have been suspended or have never 
been implemented;
b) characteristically they follow heavier than usual 
winter or spring rains resulting in a markedly in-
creased fly hatch, and a triggering sporadic out-
break but with some 4-6 or more animals sick or 
dead before veterinary help is sought by the owner;
c) it occurs during the end of summer, erratically as a 
result of a coincidental hatch of flies, and is char-
acterized by many outbreaks involving an extensive 
area and a large number of animals. 
Management
The management of these outbreaks is not easy because 
it requires measures to block the spread of bacteria:
a) avoid the dispersion of biological fluids during 
sample collection;
b) correct handling of carcasses, such as incineration, 
hollowing and site boundaries;
c) mass vaccination of animals in at least a 15 km ra-
dius of the index outbreak;
d) quarantine in closed placed of animals with sus-
pected septicemia to avoid contact with the blood-
sucking insects or, in case of inability for the high 
costs, sprinkle the body of animals with insect re-
pellents;
e) antibiotic treatment of animals with suspected ill-
ness;
f) vaccination of animals after verifying that body 
temperature is normal;
g) a second vaccination two weeks after the first;
h) suspend handling of animals to minimize stress;
i) greater attention by physicians to possible increas-
es of skin lesions in the exposed population.
Preventive activity
To prevent this type of outbreak it is necessary to 
adopt the same measures to prevent the classical an-
thrax outbreaks:
a) implement programs of mass vaccination in the 
affected area for at least five years following the 
epidemic;
b) identification of areas at risk through environmen-
tal analysis for increased surveillance;
c) avoid producing and exporting crop soils with high 
levels of contamination by anthrax spores;
d) compensate farmers who report illness and do not 
slaughter sick animals;
e) sensitize stakeholders: farmers, butchers, veteri-
narians and physicians;
f) training and information, with particular reference 
to school students and rural populations living in 
high-risk areas.
CONCLUSION 
Anthrax is present in many parts of the world, spo-
radic cases occurring in animals worldwide. The use 
of anthrax in bioterrorism and the pathology of the 
disease intensify the need of improved surveillance 
system and efficient prophylactic measures. Anthrax 
should be considered as a neglected disease, espe-
cially the atypical outbreaks. The awareness by the 
veterinary and medical health authorities should be 
increased, to avoid missing cases.
To intensify the fight against the disease, the im-
provement of the Sterne vaccine is essential, because 
while it is valid in programs of disease control, in 
emergency situations only 80% of vaccinated animals 
are protected starting from 7 days from vaccination 
[11]. In addition, the Sterne vaccine is a live attenu-
ated vaccine and therefore cannot be used in animals 
during antibiotic therapy. A cheap, improved, live-
stock vaccine is needed that can be used with anti-
biotics.
Moreover, efforts should be increased to improve 

























of identifying B. anthracis, with particular regard 
to molecular tools, in order to rapidly detect the 
pathogen in environmental samples with low levels 
of contamination. In areas where the disease is en-
demic, it is important to improve the information 
and training of personnel as well as making the 
public aware of the dangers resulting from the ma-
nipulation of infected animals and their products. 
To reduce this risk, international cooperation must 
provide resources to encourage farmers to destroy 
infected animals.
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